Introduction
Assuming that the new constitutional documents in Central and Eastern Europe have institutionalized democracy, the rule of law and basic human rights, and basically are in line with international and European standards, the main problem is that of their implementation.
1 A condition of democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law would emerge if constitutional/judicial review through constitutional courts or judicial review would ensure that the constitution is followed.
This would also be the case with the 1993 Russian Constitution. Whatmakes it what Richard Sakwa once called a triumph of "ethical individualism". 2 Although the Russian Constitution of 1993 is ambiguous 3 in several aspects, especially in the area of federalism, and consequently gave rise to on democracy and the value of the individual person. Articles 1, 2, 6 (2), 17 (1)(2), 18 and 55 of the Russian Constitution are especially important in this respect. 4 In this sense, the 1993 Constitution can be seen as an instrument of change from an undemocratic or unstable system to a democratic and stable system with emphasis on respect for the individual.
5
Such liberal romanticism, however, belongs to a bygone era in Russia. The text must be put in a concrete context. The problem that will be discussed in this chapter is how the constitutional text will be interpreted -cal, legal and social situation. The institutional concept "court" is used here although the Russian Constitutional
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The political regime has changed under Putin through a number of legislative measures which, taken together, would imply a new constitutional order, although the 1993 Constitution itself has not been changed. This is particularly noticeable in the area of federalism. In the area of federalism, the Court has sustained federal statutes, but it has added that the separation of powers between federal authorities, especially the Presidency and the regions must be balanced, 7 while gradually the federalist structure of the Russian Federation has been eroded. 8 Although constitutional development without a change of the text of the constitution is possible and often desirable in certain cases, the risk remains that the constitutional document loses its normative force and major discrepancies occur between the constitutional text, constitutional judicial practice, constitutional practice of other institutions, and constitutional reality. The constitutional and legal order could have been the decisive counterbalancing factor to a more authoritarian system, 9 but it seems that the Russian Constitutional Court will not accept the role of being an obstacle to Putin's centralizing legislative measures.
Putin himself, although declaring the dictatorship of law and being constitutionally endowed with the title of Guarantor of the Constitution, is not in every matter concerned with legality 10 or constitutionality. 11 Stability is his main concern. That the legislative organs have extended the tenure to an unlimited tenure up to seventy years of age would probably mean that Putin is concerned with their professionalism and well-being. 12 the sake of simplicity we will not deal with individual judges except in relation to dissenting opinions. 
